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ABSTRACT
In United States v. Berger, a Ninth Circuit panel declined
to apply the civil loss causation principles established by the
United States Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo in connection with sentencing in a criminal securities
fraud prosecution. The Ninth Circuit declined to follow
Second and Fifth Circuit decisions endorsing the application
of Dura Pharmaceuticals to criminal sentencing, creating a
circuit split. This Article examines this split over how to apply
the loss causation principles of Dura Pharmaceuticals in
connection with sentencing in criminal securities fraud
prosecutions. In addition, this Article discusses the
implications of each approach for criminal securities fraud
prosecutions, and more specifically, for sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split by holding in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 1 that a private plaintiff
claiming securities fraud must show both that the alleged fraud was
disclosed to the market and the disclosure caused a loss to
shareholders, that is, that the share price fell after the defendant’s
fraud became known. No longer could civil plaintiffs merely allege
that the price of a security was inflated on the date of the purchase
because of a defendant’s misrepresentation. Although the Supreme
Court’s decision applied to loss calculation in civil securities fraud
cases, the Second and Fifth Circuits have since suggested that the loss
causation principles described in Dura Pharmaceuticals also apply in
sentencing for criminal securities fraud cases. 2
In United States v. Berger, the Ninth Circuit diverged from the
Second and Fifth Circuits and held that federal judges need not
follow the loss causation principles that apply in private securities
actions when calculating the amount of loss for U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines purposes in criminal securities fraud cases. 3 This ruling
could have a profound effect on criminal securities fraud prosecutions
in the Ninth Circuit, resulting in sentencing enhancements for
1

Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
See United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005).
3
United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2009).
2
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defendants in criminal securities fraud cases where “fraud-on-themarket” formed the basis of the shareholders’ losses.
This Article explores the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura
Pharmaceuticals as it applies to loss causation in civil securities fraud
cases. This Article then examines the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and
the importance of loss calculation in sentence determination. Next,
this Article examines the split among the Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits in applying the loss causation principles of Dura Pharmaceuticals in connection with sentencing in criminal securities fraud
prosecutions. Finally, this Article addresses the implications of each
approach on criminal securities fraud prosecutions, and more
specifically, on sentencing.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN DURA PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC. V. BROUDO
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Supreme Court
addressed whether a plaintiff could satisfy the loss causation
requirement simply by establishing that the price of the security on
the date of purchase was inflated because of the defendant’s
misrepresentation. 4 The plaintiffs were a class of individuals who
bought stock in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Dura) on the public
securities market between April 15, 1997, and February 24, 1998. 5
The plaintiffs alleged that during that period, Dura’s managers and
directors allegedly made false statements regarding the company’s
profits and prospects for future approval of its products by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). 6
On February 24, 1998, Dura announced that its earnings would be
lower than expected, and the company’s shares lost almost half their
value in trading the next day. 7 Nine months later, Dura announced
that the FDA would not approve its new product, resulting in another
drop in its share price. 8 The plaintiffs argued that they suffered
damages by paying artificially inflated prices for Dura securities in
4
5
6
7
8

Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id. (falling from about $39 per share to about $21).
Id.
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reliance on the integrity of the market. 9
The Court recognized that an inflated purchase price in itself does
not necessarily equate to or proximately cause the economic loss. 10
At the time of initial purchase, the stock still reflects an economic
value of the inflated purchase price. If the purchaser sells the stock at
that instant, or at any other time before the truth of the
misrepresentation becomes public, the purchaser will not have
realized any loss. 11 Even if the purchaser sells the stock at a lower
price subsequent to the public release of the relevant truth, the lower
price “may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new
industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events,
which taken separately or together account for some or all of that
lower price.” 12 From this, the Court reasoned that “the most logic
alone permits . . . is that the higher purchase price will sometimes
play a role in bringing about a future loss.” 13
For these reasons, and relying on the common-law roots of
securities fraud actions, which have long required that a plaintiff
show actual damages, the Court held that an investor must show that
the fraud was publicly revealed and that the public disclosure caused
the investor’s loss. 14 In other words, an investor may not establish
loss causation by alleging that the security price was inflated because
of the defendant’s misrepresentation. In effect, the Court rejected the
notion that stock over-valuation resulting from so-called “fraud-onthe-market” may form the basis for a plaintiff’s damages award in a
private securities action. 15
II. APPLICATION OF LOSS CAUSATION PRINCIPLES TO CRIMINAL
SECURITIES FRAUD SENTENCING
Although the Supreme Court has not applied its Dura
9

Id. at 340.
Id. at 342.
11
Id. at 342-43.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 343.
14
Id. at 345-47.
15
Id. at 341-43.
10
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Pharmaceuticals loss causation principles to sentencing enhancements in criminal securities fraud cases, two federal circuit courts
have applied the principles in such a context. In United States v. Olis,
the Fifth Circuit determined that the civil loss causation principles
described in Dura Pharmaceuticals should inform criminal securities
fraud sentencing. The Second Circuit endorsed the application of
Dura Pharmaceuticals’ principles to criminal sentencing in United
States v. Rutkoske. However, before discussing Olis and Rutkoske, it
is necessary to examine the importance of loss calculation in a
criminal setting under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
A. Loss Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Using a detailed set of rules, tables, and adjustments that look at
the entire conduct of a convicted defendant, the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines produce a numerical score, or “offense level,” which then
translates into a range of months of imprisonment. Since the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 16 federal district judges
are no longer required to impose a sentence within the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. They nonetheless remain obligated to
calculate and consider the applicable sentencing range under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. 17 Therefore, the calculation of “loss” under
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines remains a critical issue at sentencing
in criminal securities fraud cases.
A defendant’s sentence in a securities case can depend heavily on
the calculation of loss under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Section
2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines governs the sentencing
calculation for fraud-based crimes, including criminal securities
fraud. 18 This section provides a base offense level for fraud-based
16

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 246 (“make the Guidelines system advisory while maintaining a strong
connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real conduct”).
18
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2010). It should be noted
that Section 2F1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines used to govern the sentencing
calculation for fraud-based crimes but was consolidated into Section 2B1.1 along
with the guidelines for theft and property destruction, effective November 1, 2001.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2010). Section
2F1.1 was applied at the trial court in both United States v. Berger and United
States v. Rutkoske. See United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (2d Cir.
17
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crimes, which may be increased depending on various factors,
including the amount of loss attributed to the offense. The U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines explain that “loss serves as a measure of the
seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s relative culpability and
is a principal factor in determining the offense level under this
guideline.” 19 As the amount of loss increases, the offense level
calculation increases, and thus the sentence increases. 20 These
increases range from zero for losses of $5,000 or less, to as many as
30 for losses exceeding $400 million. 21 For a defendant charged with
criminal securities fraud, the difference between a loss of $0 and a
loss exceeding $400 million can mean the difference between
probation and more than 19 years in prison. 22
Guidance for determining the meaning of “loss” within the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines is found in Application Note 3 of Section
2B1.1. 23 Courts are expected to apply the greater of actual loss or
intended loss. 24 In determining the actual or intended loss attributable
to a defendant’s conduct, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines require only
that courts make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available
information. 25 Due to the deference given to sentencing judges,
courts have used a variety of methods to calculate losses under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 26
2009); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2007).
19
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. background.
20
Id. at § 2B1.1(b)(1).
21
Id.
22
Assuming no other enhancements, a first-time offender involved in a
fraudulent scheme resulting in a loss of $5,000 or less faces a sentencing range of
zero to six months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a) (2010);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(A) (2010); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2010). If the loss exceeds $400
million, that same defendant would be subject to a 30-level increase to the base
offense level, resulting in a sentencing range of 188-235 months. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P) (2010); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2010).
23
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (2010).
24
Id.
25
Id. at § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C).
26
See United States v. Holliman, 291 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (relying on
losses arising from the defendant’s relevant conduct); United States v. Piggie, 303
F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2002) (relying on intended loss); United States v. Manas, 272
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The deference given to sentencing judges has resulted in
uncertainties in how loss is calculated. Combined with the great
significance given the loss figure by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
this deference has become a primary source of concern for defendants
and their counsel in criminal securities fraud cases. The following
federal circuit court decisions address this concern in applying Dura
Pharmaceuticals loss causation principles to sentencing enhancements in criminal securities fraud cases.
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Olis
The Fifth Circuit became the first appellate court to extend the
Dura Pharmaceuticals decision to criminal securities fraud cases in
United States v. Olis. 27 James Olis was sentenced to 292 months in
prison for securities fraud, mail and wire fraud, and conspiracy
arising from his work as Senior Director of Tax Planning and
International (and later, Vice President of Finance) at Dynegy
Corporation (Dynegy) on a transaction called “Project Alpha.” 28 The
offense level was “extraordinarily high” as a result of the district
court’s finding that the fraud-related losses were in excess of $100
million. 29
In examining Olis’s sentence, the court noted that Dura
Pharmaceuticals’ principles provided useful guidance for determining criminal responsibility. 30 The court looked to these principles
for guidance because they “furnish[] the standard of compensable
injury for securities fraud victims and because [they are] attuned to
stock market complexities.” 31 The Fifth Circuit vacated Olis’
sentence, finding that the district court did not take into account “the
impact of extrinsic factors on Dynegy’s stock price decline” in its
F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on gain to the defendant); United States v. Hedges,
175 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (relying on actual loss).
27
United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005).
28
Id. at 541.
29
Id. at 542, 545 (“The most significant determinant of Olis’ sentence is the
guidelines loss calculation. By the district court’s reasoning, this added twenty-six
levels to his base offense level and alone placed Olis in a punishment range
exceeding fifteen years’ imprisonment.”).
30
Id. at 546.
31
Id.
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approach to the loss calculation. 32 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
remanded to the district court to reconsider the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, including a recalc-ulation of the loss caused by Olis’s
conduct.33 On remand, the district court sentenced Olis to 72 months
in prison; 220 months less than his original sentence. 34
C. The Second Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Rutkoske
In 2007, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
United States v. Rutkoske. 35 David Rutkoske was convicted of
securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. He was
sentenced to 108 months in prison based on a U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines range determined from a total offense level of 31. 36 The
offense level included a 15-level enhancement for loss of more than
$10 million. 37 Rutkoske objected to the loss calculated by the
presentence report, which had been based on the trial testimony of a
National Association of Securities Dealers expert. 38
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit noted that Dura
Pharmaceuticals’ principles provided useful guidance for determining criminal responsibility. 39 The Second Circuit saw “no reason
why considerations relevant to loss causation in a civil fraud case
should not apply, at least as strongly, to a sentencing regime in which
the amount of loss caused by a fraud is a critical determinant of the
length of a defendant’s sentence.” 40 The court acknowledged that the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed for a “reasonable estimate” of
loss and that such allowance remained pertinent. 41 However, the
district court failed to at least approximate the amount of loss caused
32

Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 549.
34
United States v. Olis, Criminal No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048, at *13
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).
35
United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007).
36
Id. at 174.
37
Id. (The 15-level enhancement had the effect of adding 87 months onto
Rutkoske’s sentence).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 179.
40
Id.
41
Id.
33
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by the fraud absent other factors relevant to a decline in the
company’s share price. 42 Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded
to the district court to recalculate the amount of loss, for both
sentencing and restitution purposes. 43
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECLINES TO APPLY LOSS CAUSATION
PRINCIPLES IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMINAL SECURITIES FRAUD
SENTENCING
In United States v. Berger, the Ninth Circuit explicitly declined to
follow the Fifth and Second Circuits’ extension of Dura
Pharmaceuticals’ principles to criminal sentencing.44 Richard Berger,
President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board of
Craig Consumer Electronics, Inc. (Craig), 45 was convicted of 12
counts of bank and securities fraud for misrepresenting his
company’s fiscal viability and financial condition in connection with
his company’s IPO. 46 Craig was required to restate its past earnings
in the year following Berger’s misrepresentation as a result of an
audit of the company’s accounting records. 47 In the months following
the restatement, the company’s stock price fell from $4.99 to $0.99
per share. 48
The district court initially sentenced Berger to only six months
imprisonment due to its belief that “controlling authority prohibited it
from applying any sentencing facts not found by the jury.” 49 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated Berger’s sentence and remanded to
the district court for resentencing in light of United States v.
Booker. 50 On remand, the district judge sentenced Berger to 97
months in prison. 51 This sentence was on the low end of a U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months which was based
42

Id. at 180.
Id.
44
United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2009).
45
Id. at 1040.
46
Id. at 1041.
47
Id. at 1040.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1041.
50
Id.
51
Id.
43
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on an offense level that included a 14-level sentencing enhancement
for a calculated loss of $5.2 million. 52 On his second appeal, Berger
argued that the district court erred by not employing the Dura
Pharmaceuticals approach in calculating loss. 53
While recognizing that two other circuit courts had applied Dura
Pharmaceuticals’ principles to the calculation of loss in criminal
sentencing, the Ninth Circuit held that the primary rationale behind
the Dura Pharmaceuticals decision did not apply in criminal cases.54
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court in Dura
Pharmaceuticals was “concerned principally with the plaintiff’s
ability to show that he suffered actual loss caused directly—and
exclusively—by the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentation.” 55
This is in contrast to criminal cases, where the court is concerned
with the loss to society as a whole as opposed to a particular person’s
loss. 56 Therefore, even if an individual’s loss cannot be directly
linked to the fraud, there could still be general loss to society based
on the defendant’s fraud. 57
In addition, the court found that the application of Dura
Pharmaceuticals ran contrary to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Specifically, application of Dura Pharmaceuticals’ loss causation
principles to criminal sentencing enhancements would conflict with
“Congress’s clear endorsement” of the overvaluation loss
measurement method. 58 By rejecting the application of Dura
Pharmaceuticals in criminal sentencing, the Ninth Circuit relied on
its prior decision in United States v. Hicks 59 to find that “a
defendant’s sentence [must be based on the] harm that resulted from
the acts or omissions of the defendant.” 60

52

Id.
Id. at 1042.
54
Id. at 1043.
55
Id. at 1044.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1045.
59
United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2000).
60
Berger, 587 F.3d at 1044 (quoting Hicks, 217 F.3d at 1048).
53
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN UNITED
STATES V. BERGER
The amount of loss caused by securities fraud can be a key
amplifying factor at sentencing; it has the potential to increase the
offense level by as many as 30 levels. 61 For example, in Olis, the
defendant’s base offense level was increased by 26 levels due to a
loss calculation of $105 million. 62 The large impact of that loss
calculation lessens the impact of more relevant issues, such as the
actual motive of the perpetrator, extenuating circumstances, and the
personal benefit received by the defendant.63 Instead, these important
issues have been completely replaced by complex loss calculations.
Also, greater uncertainty exists under the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Berger because the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide little
guidance to courts with respect to how loss should be calculated.
Courts are expected to apply the greater of actual loss or intended loss
in its determination of loss. 64 In addition, courts need only make a
reasonable estimate of loss. 65 Since numerous theories have
developed to calculate loss, a reasonable estimate of loss may differ
depending on the sentencing court. Furthermore, these different
methods will likely be upheld in the Ninth Circuit, allowing for a
broad range of criminal sentences arising from similar conduct.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Berger will likely have
an effect on pretrial negotiations among prosecutors and criminal
securities fraud defendants. These defendants will face the tough
choice between entering into a plea agreement with a predefined
sentence or risk receiving a potentially greater sentence based on the
sentencing court’s calculation of loss under Berger. However, within
the Second and Fifth Circuits, defendants will likely have a greater
incentive to go to trial rather than negotiate a plea, because they will
be less at risk of incurring a large sentence increase due to the
sentencing court’s loss calculation.
61

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P) (2010).
United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 2005).
63
Kevin P. McCormick, Comment, Untangling the Capricious Effects of
Market Loss in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (2008).
64
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (2010).
65
Id. at § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C) (2010).
62
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CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Berger has set up a circuit conflict
among the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. This may lead to
uncertainty as to the calculation of loss in criminal securities fraud
sentencing throughout the country. Defendants in the Ninth Circuit
and perhaps other circuits may now be at the mercy of prosecutors to
reach a plea agreement before trial to avoid the nearly exponential
sentence increase that may come with the calculation of market loss
at sentencing. For those choosing to go to trial, their lawyers must
attempt to persuade sentencing courts to adopt conservative
approaches to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines calculations to avoid any
significant increase to the defendant’s offense level. Given the split
on this issue, it may be necessary for the Supreme Court to clarify
whether civil loss causation principles should be applied in criminal
securities fraud cases. Until this issue is resolved by the Supreme
Court, criminal securities fraud defendants will have a tough choice
to make: whether to settle with prosecutors before trial or risk a large
sentence increase due to market loss calculations.

